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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEA R. FICKLIN and MARGARET 
FICKLIN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
J. RALPH MACFARLANE, M.D, 
J, R. REES, M.D., 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
and 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 14271 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action based upon the alleged 
failure of the defendant physicians to obtain an informed consent 
from the plaintiff, Lea R. Ficklin, before performing open heart 
surgery on him, in the course of which a complication occurred 
resulting in serious visual deficiency, partial paralysis and 
loss of memory. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of the 
plaintiffs' evidence, the Court granted defendants' motion to 
dismiss because of plaintiffs' failure to establish a prima 
facie case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the trial court's ruling 
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April of 1971, plaintiff, Lea R. Ficklin, began 
experiencing chest pains. He consulted his family physician, 
Dr. George Lowe, who referred him to Dr. David P. Jahsman, 
a specialist in internal medicine (Tr. 231, 232). Dr. Jahsman 
diagnosed his ailment as heart disease based on hardening of 
the arteries, with a symptom of angina pectoris. The doctor 
prescribed nitroglycerin medication. He also advised him to 
avoid sudden strenuous exercise, but to obtain a certain amount 
of regular, easy exercise on a daily basis (Tr. 284). 
After the onset of the heart problem in April of 1971, Mr. 
Ficklin was unable to continue his employment at Freeport (Tr.278). 
Despite Dr. Jahsman1s treatment, Mr. Ficklin's condition 
worsened until July 10, 1971, when he experienced a heart attack 
consisting of a mild cardio infarction. He was hospitalized at 
McKay Dee Hospital for 10 days where he was placed in the 
coronary care unit and given supportive treatment for pain 
(Tr. 286, 287). 
After his release from the hospital, Dr. Jahsman continued 
to treat Mr. Ficklin. In September of 1971, he complained of 
increased chest pain and more fatigue, which concerned Dr. Jahsman 
because the symptoms indicated his heart was not strengthening 
after the heart attack. At that time, the doctor suggested 
that the plaintiff consider coronary artery bypass surgery 
which was then quite new. At that time the surgery hadn't been 
done in Ogden, although it had been done in Salt Lake City, 
- - - -i -u~,,4. *Vio nation fTr. 287, 
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The decision was made to proceed with coronary arterio-
grams which are x-ray tests to determine the flow of blood through 
the coronary arteries. These tests were done at the cardio-
pulmonary laboratory at McKay Dee Hospital on October 21, 1971, 
by Dr. Farrell Calton. The arteriograms indicated complete 
blockage of the left anterior descending coronary artery at a 
point where it was amenable to surgical treatment (Tr. 306, 307). 
The mechanics of the surgery involved opening the chest, 
stopping the heart, removing a segment of vein from the patient's 
leg, and attaching it to the artery in such a manner as to by-
pass the blocked part of the artery. During the time required 
for the operation, it was necessary to pump the patient's blood 
through a cardiopulmonary bypass machine which functioned as his 
heart and lungs. After the surgery was completed, the heart was 
reactivated (Ex. 2, hospital records). 
Dr. Jahsman discussed the risks of the surgery and the alter-
natives with the plaintiffs. They were told this would be 
the first time for the surgery to be done in the Ogden area 
(Tr. 288, 302). Dr. Jahsman informed Mr. Ficklin that he might 
not survive the operation (Tr. 35). 
In response to a question from plaintiff's counsel if it 
is standard medical practice in the community for a physician or 
surgeon to disclose specific risks assumed by patients undergoing 
coronary bypass surgery, Dr. Jahsman testified that most physicians 
would "attempt to explain broad risks without giving specific 
lists of everything that could, might, or has happened as a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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complication of any given procedure (Tr. 301)." The Ficklins 
were not informed that there was a risk of damage to the 
central nervous system (apparently sustained during the surgery) 
which was an extremely remote risk. Dr. Jahsman's feeling con-
cerning the risks incurred by Mr. Ficklin was "a sort of an 
all or none, that he would either survive the operation or 
not survive it." The risk of damage occurring to the central 
nervous system was less than one percent (Tr. 309-311). 
In response to a question from plaintiffs1 counsel whether 
he had discussed with the Ficklins the risk of this type of 
surgery, Dr. Jahsman said: 
A. In my discussion of this surgery at 
that point and still at this time I!m hesitant 
to recommend this type of surgery over a broad 
scale. It is a means of attacking a problem, and 
there are differences of opinion within the 
medical profession about this. I tended to 
drag my feet about proposing it to them, but 
in all honesty at that point there had been 
a lot of national publicity in one of the 
national magazines about what a great procedure 
it was, and I felt it only honest to bring this 
up and discuss it with them to find out if 
they were interested in it. But in my dis-
cussion with them I think I pointed out that 
going upon cardiopulmonary bypass, just having 
the heart bypassed itself, was a somewhat 
dangerous procedure, but I did not proceed to 
list all of the dangers. The surgery upon the 
coronary arteries in and of itself is also a 
dangerous procedure, and when the two of them 
are put together as they must be it becomes 
an even riskier procedure. And I believe 
that I pointed out to them in a general way 
that we were talking about a dangerous pro-
cedure to treat a dangerous disease (Tr. 292, 
293). 
The plaintiffs were aware that there would always be the 
danger of another heart attack if the surgery was not done, which Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
could be fatal (Tr. 255, 256). If Mr. Ficklin didn't ha M the 
surgery, his prognosis was one of continued disability; the 
expectation was that over a period of time his condition would 
get worse (Tr. 302, 303). 
In September Dr. Jahsman had a discussion with the Ficklins 
regarding the results of the arteriogram tests and the decision 
was made to proceed with the surgery at that time, and to consult 
with a thoracic surgeon who could perform the procedure. The 
names of a number of thoracic surgeons were discussed, including 
the defendants, Drs. Macfarlane and Rees. Dr. Jahsman told 
the Ficklins that the procedure had not at that time been 
performed in Ogden, and if they had any questions about being 
the first case that he would put them in contact with one of 
the teams in Salt Lake City who had done the procedure (Tr. 
289, 290). 
Even though Drs. Macfarlane and Rees had not performed 
this type of surgery as a team, both were qualified cardio-
vascular surgeons, and had prior experience in cardiac surgery 
of this type and in the use of the cardiopulmonary bypass 
machine (Tr. 290, 291). 
The Ficklins first met with the defendant doctors after 
Mr. Ficklin was admitted to the McKay Dee Hospital and prior 
to surgery, which was performed on November 3, 1971. The defen-
dants told them what the surgical procedure would be. A comment 
was made by one of the doctors that there was a risk involved 
in any surgery, even an appendectomy or routine procedure. The 
Ficklins knew that heart surgery was more serious than an 
aDnendertnmv fTr ?^ fi -)XQ*\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr, Ficklin signed a consent to the operation, which was 
admitted in evidence as Exhibit 1. Both plaintiffs read it 
before Mr. Ficklin signed it (Tr. 262, 273). 
The operation was performed on November 3, 1971. Nothing 
unusual occurred during the procedure (Ex. 2). Following the 
surgery, the defendant doctors became aware that a complication 
had occurred consisting of a neurological deficit, which was 
manifested by impaired vision, impaired speech and paralysis on 
the left side of Mr. Ficklin's body. Dr. William R. Schmidt, 
a neurologist, was called into the case as a consultant by the 
defendants. The physicians agreed that Lea Ficklin had sustained 
damage to the central nervous system, but were unable to deter-
mine the actual cause of the damage. There were a number of 
things that could have caused it (Tr. 305, 314, 315). 
ARGUMENT , ,
 f 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THOSE RISKS WHICH A 
REASONABLE PHYSICIAN IN UTAH WOULD DISCLOSE TO A PATIENT IN 
SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. 
There are no Utah Supreme Court decisions on the question 
of the nature and extent of the risks that must be disclosed 
to a patient in order for a physician to obtain the informed 
consent of his patient to a proposed surgical procedure; however, 
the principle has been enunciated in prior Utah decisions that 
expert medical testimony is necessary to establish the standard 
of care to which a physician must adhere, except in those 
situations where the propriety of the treatment is within the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
common knowledge of laymen or where there is gross neglect. 
In Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 U.2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959), 
a medical malpractice case dealing with alleged negligent treat-
ment, the court stated that: 
In the absence of a standard of care 
established by expert medical testimony and 
some evidence showing a deviation from this 
standard it must be presumed that the physician 
skillfully operated on and treated the plain-
v tiff. To allow the question of negligence to 
be submitted to the jury without first estab-
lishing a standard of care would allow a jury 
to indulge in a type of speculation not generally 
allowed. ... It is seldom that a doctor's stan-
dard of care, because it is too specialized, is 
known or is within the knowledge of a layman. 
10 U.2d 40, 44-45. 
See also, Malmstrom v. Olsen, 16 U.2d 316, 400 P.2d 209 (1965), 
Huggins v. Hicken, 310 P.2d 523, 6 U.2d 233 (1957), Anderson 
v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943), Baxter v. Snow, 
78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931). 
The rationale requiring expert testimony in a medical 
malpractice action involving an allegation of improper diagnosis 
or treatment is equally applicable to such an action brought under 
the theory of lack of informed consent. A physician possesses 
and exercises skills and knowledge beyond those of the layman 
and must therefore be judged by a different standard. The same 
skill and knowledge applied in diagnosis and treatment of an 
injury or illness must necessarily be applied by a physician 
in the decisions to disclose or not to disclose to the perhaps 
critically ill patient the need for treatment, the risks involved, 
the likelihood of success and the available alternatives. These Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
can properly evaluate. Such factors include the likely effect 
of the disclosure on the patient's condition and the amount of 
risk to the patient considering his medical history. As testified 
by Dr. Jahsman a "judgment decision" is required of the physician 
as to the surgical risks of which a patient should be informed 
(Tr. 303-305). In this instance, the Ficklins and Dr. Jahsman 
had made the decision to have the surgery performed; the only 
question was whether it should be done by Drs. Macfarlane and Rees, 
or by physicians practicing in Salt Lake City. 
The majority of the courts that have dealt with informed 
consent have held that expert testimony must be produced by a 
plaintiff in order to establish both the existence and the 
extent of a doctor's duty to inform his patient of treatment 
alternatives and material risks of those alternatives. 52 ALR3d 
1084. 
i 
In Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing 
denied, 354 P.2d 670, 187 Kan. 186 (1960), a case dealing with 
the failure of a physician to give any information whatever to 
i 
a patient regarding the hazards of proposed radiation treatment, 
the court ruled that expert testimony was unnecessary to estab-
lish breach of duty. However, the court further stated that 
. . . i 
where some disclosure of risks is made to a patient the follow-
ing rule is applicable: 
The duty of the physician to disclose, 
however, is limited to those disclosures 
which a reasonable medical practitioner 
would make under the same or similar 
circumstances. How the physician may 
best discharge his obligation to the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
patient in this difficult situation 
involves primarily a question of 
medical judgment. So long as the dis-
closure is sufficient to assure an in-
formed consent, the physician's choice 
of plausible courses should not be called 
into question if it appears, all circum-
stances considered, that the physician was 
motivated only by the patient's best 
therapeutic interests and he proceeded 
as competent medical men would have done 
in a similar situation. (Emphasis added) 
350 P.2d 1093, 1106. 
The Natanson court quoted with approval from the 1957 
California case, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University 
Board of Trustees, 157 Cal. App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). 
That quotation is here set out in full in order to clarify 
the partial quotation recited in appellants' brief at page 3: 
A physician violates his duty to his 
patient and subjects himself to liability 
if he withholds any facts which are 
necessary to form the basis of an intelli-
gent consent by the patient to the proposed 
treatment. Likewise, the physician may not 
minimize the known dangers of a procedure or 
operation in order to induce his patient's 
consent. At the same time, the physician 
must place the welfare of his patient above 
all else and this very fact places him in a 
position in which he sometimes must choose 
between two alternative courses of action. 
One is to explain to the patient every risk 
attendant upon any surgical procedure or 
operation, no matter how remote; this may 
well result in alarming a patient who is 
already unduly apprehensive and who may as 
a result refuse to undertake surgery in 
which there is in fact minimal risk; it may 
also result in actually increasing the risks 
by reason of the psychological results of 
the apprehension itself. The other is to 
recognize that each patient presents a separate 
problem, that the patient's mental and emo-
tional condition is important and in certain 
cases may be crucial, and that in discussing 
the element of risk, a certain amount of 
discretion must be emnlovprl rrmc-i e + ^~4- —:*.!. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the full disclosure of facts necessary to 
an informed consent. 350 P.2d 1093, 1104. 
This viewpoint, allowing maximum flexibility for the 
physician to exercise his medical judgment in the patient's 
interest consistent with the patient's right to have risks of 
a procedure explained is expressed in subsequent Kansas cases. 
In Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d 1205 (1974) 
the court affirmed a judgment for a physician who used forceps 
to deliver a baby which was injured during the birth, after 
advising the parents of some, but not all, of the risks involved. 
The court said that in these circumstances expert testimony is 
ordinarily necessary to establish that the disclosures made 
are insufficient to accord with disclosures made by reasonable 
medical practitioners under the same or similar circumstances. 
Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606, 512 P.2d 529 (1973) involved 
a physician's decision not to tell a patient about a minimal risk 
of a particular surgical procedure; the court affirmed judgment 
for the physician and, quoting a prior Kansas decision, stated 
that: 
At no time has this court ventured to 
say that a physician or surgeon is under 
obligation to disclose any and all results 
which might possibly follow a medical or 
surgical procedure. Nor would we row deny ^ 
that there may well be circumstances under 
which it would be bad therapeutic practice 
to disclose the nature, the procedures and 
the possible harsh results of treatment. 
512 P.2d 529, 538. 
The following jurisdictions from adjacent states adhere to 
the majority position: Stundon v. Stadnik, 469 P.2d 16 (1970, 
- - " - « - " » **--*- AH AA& D 1A A?>f> 
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(1968), Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 
(1965), Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970), 
Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (1974, CA 5). 
In this case, the plaintiffs were aware of the risk of death 
as a complication of this very serious open-heart surgery, which 
had never been performed in Ogden and was a new type of surgery 
being done in the nation. They were also aware of the alter-
natives to having the surgery: continued disability with the 
ever present hazard of another and possibly fatal heart attack. 
The following exchange took place between plaintiffs' 
counsel and Dr. Jahsman regarding the standard practice in the 
community for disclosure of risks in the type of heart surgery 
involved: 
Q. Do you know, Dr. Jahsman, if it is standard 
medical practice in this community for a physician 
or surgeon to disclose specific risks that a patient 
is assuming and undertaking when they undergo this 
type of surgery? 
*** 
A. I believe most of us will attempt to explain 
broad risks without giving specific lists of every-
thing that could, might or has happened asa compli-
cation of any given procedure (Tr. 301). 
*** 
On cross-examination, Dr. Jahsman testified: 
Q. Now, doctor, as to the risks that a physician 
discusses with a patient prior to surgery, that 
depends to a great extent upon particular circumstances, 
does it not; that is, a patient's condition and whether 
he is worried about the surgery and the inherent or 
probable risks as distinguished from remote risks; 
are all those factors you have to take into considera-
tion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, doctor, no doctor would be required by 
a good medical nrarfir^ +^ +«n - „^ _-- * 
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risk, which was not as distinguished from a probable 
risk; isnft that right, sir? 
A. This gets to be a matter of how much time we 
can take explaining risks to patients when you mention 
remote as opposed to probable. 
Q. In fact, there is some danger in mentioning 
remote risks and going through all the possible risks 
and causing the patient harm by increasing his 
worry or stress about the operation, is there not? 
A. This is conceivable. 
Q. Yes, and so it has to be a judgment decision 
on the part of the doctor as to just what risks he 
discusses with the patient, isn't that right, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I suppose that there is a rule there are 
no two patients alike--some are more concerned, more 
worried than others? 
A. Correct...... 
Q. And they all vary as to the physical reactions 
and the ability they have to withstand the stress of 
operations, I suppose? . . . •, 
A. Correct. 
(Tr. 304-305). . 
In a recent Fifth Circuit decision the court's discussion 
is particularly appropriate in light of the foregoing testimony 
from the present case. The court in Karp v. Cooley, supra, 
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant doctor on the 
issue of informed consent. There, a mechanical heart was 
implanted in the chest of a patient with severe heart disease. 
The patient's widow filed suit claiming that neither she nor 
her husband had been advised of the experimental nature of 
the surgical procedure. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After stating that "(p)hysicians and surgeons have a 
duty to make a reasonable disclosure to a patient of risks that 
are incident to medical diagnosis and treatment" (citations 
omitted) and that "(t)rue consent to what happens to one's 
self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails 
an opportunity to evaluate knowledgably the options available 
and the risks attendant upon each," 493 F.2d 408, 419, (citing 
Canterbury v. Spence), the court set forth the following rationale 
for requiring expert testimony as to what a reasonable practi-
tioner would disclose to a patient: 
The question to be determined by the 
jury is whether the defendant doctor in 
that particular situation failed to adhere 
to a standard of reasonable care. These are 
not matters of common knowledge or within 
the experience of layment. Expert medical 
evidence thereon is just as necessary as 
is such testimony on the correctness of the 
handling in cases involving surgery or 
treatment . . . Without the aid of expert 
medical testimony . . .' a jury could not, 
without resorting to conjecture and surmise 
or by setting up an arbitrary standard of 
their own, determine that defendants 
failed to exercise their skill and use 
the_ care exercised by the ordinarily 
skillful, careful and prudent physician 
acting under the same or similar circum-
stances . ; . The question is not what, 
regarding the risks involved, the juror 
would relate to the patient under the same 
or similar circumstances, or even what a 
reasonable man would relate, but what a 
reasonable medical practitioner would do. 
Such practitioner would consider the 
state of the patientfs health, the condition 
of his heart and nervous system, his mental 
state, and would take into account, among 
other things, whether the risks involved 
were remote possibilities or something which 
occurred with some sort of frequency or regu^ 
larity. This determination involves medical 
judgment as to wh^ t-h^ ^ AIC?~-I~~ _r .* -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
risks may have such an adverse effect on 
the patient as to jeopardize success of the ^ 
proposed therapy, no matter how expertly per-
formed. (Emphasis added) supra at p. 420. 
In Karp, nine doctors testified but no standard of dis-
closure was set forth for such an experimental operation, and, ' 
thus, there was no testimony as to what risks under these cir-
cumstances a physician should disclose. In this analogous 
situation, Dr. Jahsman testified: ' 
Q. Do you have knowledge, sir, as to 
whether or not this type of pulmonary bypass 
operation had ever been performed in Ogden, 
Utah prior to November 3, 1971? . 
A. I knew that it had not. 
Q. So you don't know what the standard of 
informing them of what the risks would be in 
this community at that time; is that correct, i 
sir? % 
A. If you're starting on new grounds why 
I guess we have to accept the rules as we sent 
along in that case. 
None of the physicians were able to determine the actual cause 
of the complication experienced by the plaintiff; not knowing 
the cause, there was no way in which the physicians could be 
i 
reasonably expected to foresee damage to the central nervous 
system as a probable risk. 
The plaintiffs' brief cites Canterbury v. Spence, 150 App. 
I 
D.C. 263, 464 F.2d 772 (1972) as being representative of the 
minority view that expert medical testimony is not necessai;' to 
establish the required standard disclosure in informed consent 
cases. That case involved a young patient who became paralyzed 
after a surgical procedure which the treating physician described 
to the patient's mother as "no more serious than any other 
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No statement whatever of any risks was given to the patient 
or his mother. In addition, the District of Columbia had a 
line of cases, contrary to the prevailing rule in Utah, that 
the reasonableness of a medical procedure is not defined by 
the prevailing medical practice. The failure of the physician 
in that case to relate any risks of the procedure and the previous 
case law in the jurisdiction in which this case arose distinguishes 
Canterbury v. Spence from the instant case. 
Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972) is 
another widely cited minority case in which the court reversed 
a judgment against a physician inasmuch as the general verdict 
did not make clear whether or not the jury found that the physician 
had negligently performed an operation to remove a duodenal 
ulcer or whether he had negligently failed to inform the patient 
of the risks involved. The court found no evidence of negligence 
in the performance of the operation. 
Explaining that the issue of informed consent was likely 
to arise on re-trial, the court, by dicta, discussed informed 
consent. In that court's opinion, where a complicated surgical 
procedure is involved, a medical doctor has a duty to disclose 
to his patient the potential for death or serious harm. 
Beyond the foregoing minimal disclosure, 
a doctor must also reveal to his patient 
such additional information as a skilled 
practitioner of good standing would provide 
under similar circumstances. ... The scope 
of the physician's communications to the 
patient, then, must be measured by the 
patient's need, and that need is what-
ever information is material to the deci-
sion. Thus, the test for determining 
whether a potential peril must be divulged 
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is its materiality to the patient's decision. 
(Citing Canterbury vs. Spence) 502 P.2d 1, 11. 
Apparently, because the court was giving general instructions 
to the trial court for re-trial, the court did not provide 
guidelines for determining what is a "material11 risk. 
It is important to note that in Cobbs, as in Canterbury, 
none of the inherent risks of the operation were disclosed to 
the patient. 
In the present case, the plaintiffs failed to produce expert 
testimony as to what additional risks, if any, beyond the risk 
of death, should have been disclosed to them by the defendant 
doctors. In the absence of such testimony, the Court properly 
dismissed the plaintiffs1 Complaint. To do otherwise would have 
forced the jury to in effect make a medical judgment based on 
speculation. The only medical evidence regarding the disclosure 
of risks of medical procedures in Utah was Dr. Jahsmanfs testi-
mony that broad risks of Many given procedure" are explained to 
a patient. As in Karp, supra, there was no testimony as to what 
i 
risks a physician would disclose in similar circumstances. Without 
a standard to guide them, the jury could only speculate whether 
the disclosure to the Ficklins satisfied the defendant doctors' 
duty. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
EXTREMELY REMOTE RISKS OF THE CONTEMPLATED SURGICAL PROCEDURE. < 
The plaintiffs argue that the risk of central nervous 
damage was a material risk that the defendant doctors had a 
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is not required to define materiality. This view is not 
supportable when the question of the materiality of a risk 
is considered in detail and in relation to a specific factual 
situation. 
What is or is not a material risk 
depends upon the facts of the particular 
case. The only risks which a doctor must 
disclose are those inherent in the pro-
cedure he proposes. He need not disclose 
unexpected risks that may arise in connection 
with the procedure, or risks which may be a 
remote possibility as distinguished from a 
probability. Louisell and Williams, Medical 
Malpractice, Vol. 2, Sec. 2205. 
The appellants1 brief cites Holland v. Sisters of St. 
Joseph of Peace, Oregon, 522 P.2d 208, (1974) for the proposition 
that expert testimony is not required to show materiality of 
risk. In fact, that decision stands for the proposition that 
expert testimony is required before the question of materiality 
can be considered by the jury, and it provides guidelines for 
determining what minimum testimony must be present before a jury 
may judge whether a defendant physician has failed in his duty 
to advise a patient of material risks. Those guidelines have 
particular relevance to the instant case. 
In Holland the plaintiff alleged that she was not informed 
by the treating physicians that proposed radiation treatment 
involved dangers of serious injury to healthy organs. Quoting 
a prior Oregon case, Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 
489 P.2d 953 (1971) the court said: 
When medical testimony has been intro-
duced showing that the risk is material, 
that alternatives are feasible, and that 
Hi < ; r 1 n Q n r p n -P f-Vio -r-icV w i l l -n /•> +• K/=k A ss4--* 1 _ 
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mental to the patient, the duty to warn and 
advise of alternatives is not based upon the 
custom of physicians in the locality. 522 
P.2d 208, 209, 
The court went on to say that: t 
The factors which determine the significance 
of the risk are the incidence of the injury 
from a certain treatment and the degree of 
harm that might be involved. ... If a serious I 
injury might occur from a given method of 
treatment, the physician must inform the 
patient of all but extremely remote risks. 
(Emphasis added). 522 P.2d 208, 212. 
If the incidence and seriousness of potential injuries as * 
a result of proposed surgical procedure must be shown by expert 
testimony and if extremely remote risks need not be related, it 
follows that where the only expert testimony is that a particular j 
risk of a surgical procedure is extremely remote, there is nothing 
for the jury to decide--there is no requirement that the patient 
be informed of such remote risks. M 
Dr. Jahsman, the only expert witness who gave an opinion 
as to the risks involved in the type of surgery performed on 
Lea Ficklin testified as follows upon re-direct examination: | 
Q. In the case of Lea Ficklin, and 
your understanding of his medical condition 
at the time that you referred him to Doctors 
Macfarlane and Rees, did you consider the 
risk of damage to the central nervous system I 
a remote risk? 
A. Extremely remote. 
Q. Did you consider the loss of vision, 
memory or paralysis as a remote risk? I 
A. Very much. Very remote. 
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Q. What did you understand the risks 
to be on the surgery on Mr. Ficklin at that 
time? 
A. My major feeling of the risk was a 
sort of all or none, that he would either 
survive the operation or not survive it 
(Tr. 309, 310). 
Q. In your experience, did you become 
aware of any damage to the central nervous 
system as a result of this procedure? 
*** 
A. When I was a resident in Detroit, we 
had a very active heart surgery team, and 
I can recall in the three years I was there 
I saw one case. The percentage, I have no 
idea, but it was less than one percent 
(Tr. 310, 311). 
In Mason v. Ellsworth, 474 P.2d 909, 3 Wash. App. 298 
(1970), the court reversed a judgment for the defendant doctor 
on other grounds but, addressing the issue of informed consent, 
stated that the injury sustained, a punctured esophagus, was 
not a reasonably foreseeable risk of the surgical procedure 
performed inasmuch as it occurred in Mat most 3/4 of one percent 
(.75%)" of the surgical procedures involved. 474 P.2d 909, 919. 
In Getchell, supra, a patient diagnosed as having a separated 
shoulder, had the parts of the shoulder joined with wires in a 
surgical procedure performed by one of the defendant doctors. 
The court struck from the complaint allegations that the 
defendants failed to advise the patient of the risks of the 
procedure. 
Discussing the evidence required to show what, if any, 
risks must be disclosed, the court said: 
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Materiality is an issue which in most 
instances will require expert medical 
:
 ; testimony. For example, does an infection 
and loss of vision occur after a cataract 
operation sufficiently often that a patient 
deciding whether to undergo such surgery 
should be advised of this possibility? 
Or, in the present case, what are the 
chances of the wires breaking and what 
will happen if they do break? These 
are matters about which medical testimony 
is essential. 489 P.2d 953, 956. 
One of the defendant doctors, Dr. Hiestand, was called 
as an adverse witness by the plaintiff and his was the only 
expert testimony in the case directed to the materiality of 
the risks involved. He said that: 
The breaking of the wires was not a 
"general riskM of using the wiring procedure. 
He stated they would not break if they were 
not subjected to too much strain. Supra at 
page 957. 
The court found that this testimony was not sufficient 
evidence that the breaking of the wires was a material risk 
of the surgical procedure. 
The plaintiffs in their brief on appeal cite Cooper v. 
Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971) for the 
proposition that even a minute risk of a surgical procedure must 
be dislosed to a patient. In that case, the patient was hospi-
talized for examination of a suspicious growth in her hernia 
and the examination was conducted by means of the insertion of 
a 1/4M diameter fiberglass instrument in the patient's stomach. 
The incidence of perforation of the stomach wall by the 
instrument was 1/2500 or .0004 percent. The patient's stomach 
wall was perforated. The superior court reversed the trial Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court's judgment in favor of the defendant doctors. Contrary 
to the decisions in all of the leading cases in recent years 
which have addressed this problem, the superior court pro-
pounded the rule that an operation performed without informed 
consent is a technical assualt, and it therefore imposed a 
strict standard for disclosure upon the defendant physicians. 
It is important to note that in Cooper the evidence showed 
that the plaintiff was never informed of any risks attendant on 
the operation. M0n one occasion (the plaintiff) was assured 
that 'the examination was a relatively simple diagnostic 
procedure and that (there) should not be any trouble with 
it.'" 286 A.2d 647, 648. 
The court's decision in Cooper is not applicable to the 
fact situation in the present case where the risk of death was 
disclosed to the plaintiffs, who then elected to proceed with 
the operation. Where the most serious risk possible, death, 
is disclosed to a patient, it would be unreasonable to place 
upon a physician the burden of disclosing very minimal risks 
which are remote and cannot reasonably be anticipated. 
The Utah Legislature has, in effect, established as 
public policy in this state that physicians are not under a 
duty to disclose remote risks of a medical procedure to their 
patients. In its 1976 budget session the legislature enacted 
- the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act" which codifies the 
elements of proof in a medical malpractice action based upon 
a claim of lack of informed consent. Section 6 (1) (d) of 
substitute H."R ^ ***"-* -* 
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be dependent, inter alia, upon a showing by the patient that 
"the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and 
significant risk of causing the patient serious harm. ...ff 
Section 6(2)(a) sets forth the following as a defense to such 
an action: "A risk of the serious harm which the patient 
actually suffered was relatively minor. ..." 
While this legislative action is not binding in actions 
arising out of an operation performed prior to the passage of the 
Act, the language clearly supports the defendants1 assertion that 
{ 
physicians should not be required to discuss every risk of a 
proposed procedure, where the probability of the complication 
is minimal. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANTS' FAILURE 
TO INFORM THEM OF RISKS IN ADDITION TO THE RISK OF DEATH WAS 
THE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY LEA FICKLIN. 
i 
The burden of proof of proximate cause is upon the plaintiffs. 
In Shetter v. Rochelle, supra, the court asserted that: 
. . .(U)nder malpractice theories, there 
would be no damage proximately resulting from 
the failure to disclose unless the plaintiff 
would not have had the operation if the 
disclosure had been made. ... One expression 
of this rule is by Dean Prosser: 
On the other hand, an act or omission 
is not regarded as a cause of an event 
if the particular event would have occurred 
without it. Prosser, Torts, (3d ed.) P. 242. 
A plaintiff must not only prove that a physician failed 
to make a reasonable disclosure of risks involved in proposed 
surgery, but also that the patient would not have consented 
to the nrocedure had ^ e been given all of the information regarding 
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anticipated possible hazards. Dowe v. Permente Medical Group, 
90 Cal. Rptr. 747, 12 Cal. App.2d 488. 
The plaintiffs here both testified that they would not 
have consented to the operation had they been advised that a 
risk of the operation was central nervous system damage, including 
partial paralysis and blindness. While the plaintiffs were 
properly permitted to testify from "hindsight" as to what their 
decision would have been, such testimony did not compel sub-
mission of the plaintiffs' case to the jury. Such testimony 
is not controlling since the test of whether or not a patient 
in a particular situation would have consented to a proposed 
procedure is objective—what would a prudent person in the 
patient's position have decided with adequate disclosure. 
Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d 539 (1973), Cobbs 
v. Grant, supra, Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211, Wash. App. (1974). 
Another court has said: 
. . .(W)here the patient fully appreciates 
the danger involved, the failure of a physician 
in his duty to make a reasonable disclosure to 
the patient would have no causal relationship 
to the injury. In such event the consent of 
the patient to the proposed treatment is an 
informed consent. The burden of proof rests 
throughout the trial of the case upon the 
patient who seeks to recover in a malpractice 
action for her injury. Natanson v. Kline, supra, 
350 P.2d 1093, 1106. 
Likewise, the California court in Canterbury v. Spence, 
supra, said that: 
If adequate disclosure could reasonably 
be expected to have caused that person to 
decline the treatment because of the reve-
lation of the kind of risk or danger that 
resulted in harm, can sat-inn TC cv»^ r^  u,,4. 
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A review of the testimony of the plaintiffs as to what 
risks they were aware of and as to what the alternatives to 
the proposed surgical procedure were demonstrates clearly that 
a jury could not reasonably find that the plaintiffs would have 
refused to consent to the proposed operation if additional risks 
had been revealed to them. Their testimony was that they were 
aware that the procedure carried with it the risk of death. 
They were also aware that in the absence of the surgical procedure 
Mr. Ficklin could be stricken with a second heart attack at any 
time which could be fatal. 
The plaintiffs1 testimony born of hindsight that Lea 
Ficklin would not have consented to the operation had the 
plaintiffs known of the Mextremely remote1' risk of central 
nervous system damage is not reasonable or probative evidence. 
If a surgeon can be held responsible for not informing a patient 
of the infinite variety of remote complications which can and 
do result from major surgery, applying tf20-20 vision of hindsight" 
after the event, the issue of informed consent would always 
involve a question of fact resulting in an intolerable burden 
on the medical profession. Again, in this instance, Dr. Jahsman, 
the plaintiffs1 attending physician, testified he believed the 
operation was a nsort of all or none, that he would survive the 
operation or not survive it." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' 
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The plaintiffs failed to present expert testimony as to 
the standard of disclosure required of a reasonable medical 
practitioner in circumstances similar to those involved in this 
lawsuit. Without such a standard before them, the jury could 
not be expected to judge the materiality of the risks which 
were disclosed to the plaintiffs. 
The defendant physicians did not have a duty to disclose 
all possible risks, including extremely remote risks, of the 
proposed surgical procedure to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs failed to bear their burden of showing, in 
light of all the facts available to them, particularly the risk 
of death, that they would not have consented to the coronary 
bypass operation had they been advised of a remote risk of 
central nervous sytem damage. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7 day of February, 1976. 
HANSON, WADSWORTH $ RUSSON 
*>?lj0*p\^ 
>o/m^\ 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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